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Abstract This paper surveys the evidence that environmental auditing systems (EMSs), and the
standard setting bodies represented by ISO 14001 and EMAS, have failed to meet their objectives
on two counts. First, the standards will not lead to sustainability and second, they will not be any
more economically efficient than the command and control approach. We begin by offering an
historical overview of environmental standards and argue that the original intentions to link the
environmental management standards with sustainability was abandoned during discussions.
The opposing viewpoints about ISO 14001 and EMAS as market driven standards are discussed
and then the degree of market penetration of the standards is examined. The costs of
implementing an EMS are discussed in the context of the Swiss experience, and the costs to SMEs
of EMSs outlined. Practical difficulties associated with the standards are considered, and the
question asked, “Do EMSs lead to environmental improvement?”
Introduction: a brief history of environmental standards
A recent development in Europe and North America, environmental law emerged and
evolved rapidly in the last third of the 20th century. By the mid-1990s, highly complex
regulatory frameworks existed in many countries. In Germany, for example there
were approximately 800 environmental laws, 2,800 ordinances and 4,700 technical
instructions. If state (la¨nder) laws are taken into account, the total number of
domestic environmental regulations may be as high as 35,000 (Wurzel et al., 2003b,
p. 117, 120).
Most environmental regulation is “command and control”. Regulatory agencies may
specify goals to be achieved and how this must be done. Polluting activities are
managed, for example, by means of performance standards and technology based
controls. Performance standards are generally enforced by means of permits/licenses.
Technology based controls may be specific (e.g. a requirement to use catalytic
converters) or general (e.g. a requirement to use “best available technologies”).
The violation of regulations may lead to civil penalties and/or criminal prosecutions
(Orts, 1995, p. 1235; Wolf and Stanley, 2003, pp. 5-11).
Several criticisms have been made of command and control approaches to
environmental protection. It is often argued that market based instruments (MBIs) are
economically more effective and efficient than more traditional forms of regulation.
Command and control strategies can be difficult to implement. They rely on
enforcement agencies which may be reluctant to use the powers they possess (Watson,
2003; Wolf and Stanley, 2003, pp. 47-54). They also depend on the existence of
reasonably comprehensible bodies of environmental law. Some critics refer to the rapid
growth of this area of law as “environmental juridification” (i.e. the proliferation of
environmental law). Others refer ironically to “legal pollution” (Orts, 1995, p. 1237)[1].
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Dissatisfaction with environmental regulation led to the introduction of a range of
new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs). These include market-based
instruments such as eco-taxes, voluntary agreements between industry and public
authorities, and “informational devices” such as eco-labels and environmental auditing
schemes (Jordan et al., 2003, p. 3). The rise of environmental auditing is not, therefore,
an isolated phenomenon.
Environmental auditing began in North America in the 1980s (Watson and Emery,
n.d.). At first, industries and individual businesses created systems that suited their
own needs. By the early 1990s there was growing support for the establishment of
internationally recognised auditing procedures. In 1993, the European Community
adopted its Eco-Management and Audit Regulation (1836/93/EC). An international
system – ISO 14001 – was created by the International Standardisation Organisation
(ISO) (2003) 2 years later.
These systems – like other NEPIs – were generally welcomed.
Beginning with the mid-1990s, ISO 14001 and EMAS (the European Union’s
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) became very much in vogue as the tool for
demonstrating environmental responsibility in the global marketplace. Consultants jumped
on ISO and EMAS as the next opportunity in a mature market no longer driven by regulatory
dynamics (MacLean, 2004, p. 13).
There was a general belief that the approach would lead to environmental
self-regulation by business organizations, and lighten the heavy hand of government
that controlled by regulation. As a result, both the European and the international
standard were met with some enthusiasm. Whether this initial enthusiasm was
justified is the subject of this paper.
Environmental management systems and sustainability
From the start, those developing the standards were driven by more than the desire to
relax the heavy hand of the state. Most organizations were acutely aware of the need to
deal with the tougher environmental controls that Europe and the US were putting in
place. There was also the issue of sustainable development to consider. Environmental
management systems were greatly encouraged by the Brundtland Commission Report,
Our Common Future (World Commission on Environmental Development, 1987).
EMSs were to be the corporate sector’s response to Brundtland. It was clear that
pollution and sustainable development were key issues for environmental accounting.
The Brundtland Report stressed the need to address them at national and international
levels. For businesses it meant that they could no longer treat environmental costs as
an externality; they would be required to internalise these costs (Emery, 2002). If an
EMS was to be successful then it would “. . . have a method of accounting for the full
environmental costs, and these should be integrated into capital budgeting, cost
allocation and other decisions” (Fortes, 2003, p. 80). This has serious cost implications
for companies. If the environment – what Bob Gray has called natural capital – is seen
as an externality then it is a free good as far as a business is concerned, and as free
good will be consumed to the point where its marginal utility is zero (Gray and
Bebbington, 2001).
The hopes for ISO 14001 and EMAS centred on them leading to firms achieving
sustainability. These hopes would be realised only if the standards led to
environmental improvement through firms measuring the amount of environmental
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damage incurred and then seeking to reduce this amount in the future. In other words,
the standards need to focus on performance. We have mentioned in this paper and
elsewhere that whilst this may have been the initial aim of the standard setters, these
original aims were watered down and the standards came to focus only on
conformance.
ISO, a market driven standard?
The view is prevalent that in future ISO 14001 will be a requirement for entering the
market place, and that market forces will ensure its implementation through the supply
chain. But there are dissenting voices, and it has been argued that the pressures for
implementation are not as direct as in the case of ISO 9000 because “. . . no immediate
impact on product quality or usability is associated with better environmental
management” (Roht-Arriaza, 2002, p. 264).
This market imperative perspective has led to the view that ISO 14001 may pose a
threat to the economies of developing nations, not least because the standard is now
part of the World Trade Organisation’s trading agreements, and as an international
standard it cannot be deemed a non-tariff barrier and a constraint to trade, but
developing nations fear that this might be the effect. An international standard is, like
the law and the Ritz Hotel, open to everyone. Developing nations will experience real
economic costs if ISO 14001 becomes a standard in the same form as ISO 9000.
Effectively it becomes a barrier to free trade[2]. There are those who argue that there
is not much evidence to support this view because the pressures to implement ISO
14001 are unlike those for ISO 9000, and as a result such concerns are unjustified
(Krut and Gleckman, 1998). This may be wishful thinking. Once large companies begin
to ask for certification as a prerequisite of doing business, and government
procurement agencies follow suit then previous evidence to the contrary will be
redundant.
This will mean that developing nations will be forced to play the standards game if
they wish to trade with the developed ones and then face the heavy expenditure
associated with implementing ISO 14001, a standard they had little involvement in
drafting. Being a member of the ISO club is expensive and most developing nations
whilst invited to the meetings that were involved in drafting the standard were unable
to attend because of the high costs of attendance. As a result, it is pertinent to ask
whether a standard produced under such circumstances can be regarded as truly
international.
Market penetration
Environmental auditing systems (EMSs) are unevenly distributed (Table I).
In December 2002, 83.04 per cent the world’s ISO 14001 certifications were
concentrated in Europe and the Far East. Only 5.61 per cent were in Africa, West Asia,
Central and South America. Many developing countries did not have any certifications.
There are also marked differences within continents. The European Union has
25 member states (Table II). In December 2002, Sweden had 2,730 ISO 14001
certifications (i.e. 307 per million inhabitants). Greece had 72 certifications
(i.e. 6.8 per million inhabitants). European states, which are not EU members, tend
to have low certification rates. In December 2002, Belarus, Bosnia and Macedonia had
one each.
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The distribution of EMAS registrations is also very uneven (Table III). In May 2003,
the EU had 15 member states. Austria had 310 registrations (i.e. 38.3 per million
inhabitants). Portugal had five registrations (i.e. 0.49 per million inhabitants).
How is this significant? EMSs can be regarded as “club goods” (Kollman and
Prakash, 2002; Watson and Emery, n.d.). Firms implementing such systems incur
significant costs yet the potential benefits of “club membership” are difficult to
calculate and vary between regions.
Continent/regions
Number of countries/
economies
ISO 14001 certifications
(December 2002)
Share of world certifications
(per cent of total)
Africa and West Asia 31 1,355 2.74
Australasia 2 1,563 3.16
Central and
South America 21 1,418 2.87
Europe 44 23,316 47.14
Far East 17 17,757 35.90
North America 3 4,053 8.20
Source: ISO (2003)
Table I.
ISO 14001 certifications
across the world
Countrya Population (millions)
Number of ISO 14001 certifications
by December 2002
Germany 82.5 3,700
Spain 41.2 3,228
United Kingdom 58.9 2,917
Sweden 8.9 2,730
Italy 57.9 1,894
France 59.4 1,666
Denmark 5.4 1,088
Netherlands 16.1 1,073
Finland 5.2 750
Hungary 10.2 640
Poland 38.6 434
Czech Republic 10.2 318
Austria 8.1 301
Belgium 10.3 255
Ireland 3.9 170
Slovenia 2.0 149
Portugal 10.2 137
Greece 10.6 72
Slovakia 5.4 70
Estonia 1.4 47
Lithuania 3.5 33
Cyprus 0.76 21
Latvia 2.3 20
Luxembourg 0.44 17
Malta 0.40 3
Note: aThose in italics joined EU in May 2004
Source: ISO (2003) and World Bank (2003)
Table II.
ISO 14001 certifications
in the European Union
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EMSs are designed to facilitate compliance with environmental regulations and to
satisfy the wishes/requirements of customers and other stakeholders. The incentives to
introduce such systems will therefore vary in accordance with national regulatory
frameworks and stakeholder pressures.
“Environmental leader states” such as Germany and Austria have introduced a
highly complex environmental regulations at national and state levels. These are
enforced with some rigour (Malek, 2001; Wurzel et al., 2003a, pp. 51-72, b, pp. 115-36).
EMSs (and environmental management systems in general) help to ensure that
businesses comply with these regulations (Kollman and Prakash, 2002; Watson and
Emery, n.d.).
Countries which have less effective or stringent environmental regimes may
provide firms with weaker incentives to introduce EMSs. Ireland is a good example
(Flynn, 2003, pp. 138-9):
Irish environmental regulation has generally been one of the weaker, less developed EU policy
regimes . . . Indeed Ireland, which accounts for just 1 per cent of the total EU population,
appears to account for 10 per cent of the complaints submitted to the Commission for
non-implementation of EU environmental directives . . . It is hard, therefore, not to get the
impression of a “thin” regulatory regime essentially overloaded and unable to focus on
delivering key priorities in the environmental sectors, never mind fostering NEPIs!.
The situation is broadly similar in Greece, albeit for different reasons. Greece has
a complex and centralised regulatory regime (Getimis and Giannakourou, 2001,
pp. 289-94). Unfortunately, its effectiveness leaves much to be desired (Giannakourou,
2001, p. 335):
Despite its formal, legalistic and mandatory features, environmental policy in Greece has
been shown to be incapable of influencing social and economic activities and guiding changes
in behaviour. In broad terms, the credibility of environmental policy in Greece has been
undermined, which makes it difficult for it to function under the more complex demands of an
environmental audit process.
EU member states EMAS registrations by May 2003
Germany 2,414
Austria 310
Spain 289
Sweden 201
Italy 141
Denmark 127
United Kingdom 78
Finland 41
Netherlands 27
France 24
Belgium 20
Greece 9
Ireland 8
Portugal 5
Luxembourg 1
Source: ENDS (2003a, p. 21)
Table III.
EMAS registrations in
the European Union
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In the UK, environmental law tends to be less complex than in high regulatory
states such as Germany and Austria. In addition, regulatory bodies such as the
Environment Agency for England and Wales have a strong preference for voluntary
agreements and compliance strategies. They tend to regard prosecution as “as last
resort”. When environmental offenders are convicted, sentencing tends to be lenient
(De Prez, 2000; Fineman, 2000; Watson, 2002, 2003). Although firms may adopt EMSs
for a variety of reasons, the need to ensure compliance with environmental regulations
is generally not a high priority.
EMSs may be adopted by firms if there is sufficient pressure from actual and
potential stakeholders. In environmental leader states, customers and other
stakeholders may respond positively to such schemes. In other countries, EMSs may
not give consumers and producers adequate market signals. Hillary (1998, pp. 188-9)
has described a survey of British managers:
There was a sense of frustration amongst respondents that there was not a greater interest
from the groups they were specifically seeking to reach with their environmental statements.
An even greater frustration existed with the source of the majority of the requests they
received, from students.
In essence, the economic case for adopting EMSs may depend on the existence of
a “critical mass” of ISO certifications or EMAS registrants (Hillary, 1998, pp. 187-8).
But EMSs were already in existence before the attempt was made to standardize
them. Leaving aside the issue of whether it is appropriate to attempt to standardize
something less tangible than a screw size or photographic film speed (two examples of
ISOs previous successes) the establishment of any EMS is costly even without the
added burden of accreditation and certification.
Economic costs of EMS
The costs of an EMS vary according to whether an organization adopts an in-house
approach or chooses to adopt the EMAS or ISO 14001, but a useful indication of the
possible costs of establishing an EMS can be gleaned from an interesting recent study
of Swiss firms.
The authors point out that such costs can be divided into: set-up costs, which
include the internal costs of establishing documentation and procedures and seeking
advice where required; certification costs; and annual operating costs.
Whilst the authors are keen to stress that the factual basis for their data is weak and
that they are based on companies’ rough estimates, they offer an indication of the costs
of implementing an EMS. Their figures indicate that the average cost for the set-up and
operation of EMS in a Swiss company is 287,000 Swiss francs, or $220,769 (March 2004
conversion rate). There are differences according to size of firm. For a small business
(1-49 employees) the cost is $71, 538 whilst for a medium company (50-249 employees)
it is $118,462. Whilst for large companies (250 or more employees) the cost is much
higher at $411,538, the relative cost is lower. For example the cost per employee ranges
from $4,154 in small companies to $385 in large companies (Hamschmidt and Dyllick,
2001).
The average estimated financial benefit from the expenditure is $128,462.
This ranges from $16,923 in the case of a small company and $263,846 in the case of
a large one. Payback ranges from about 2 years or less for large and medium sized
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firms, but based on their admittedly unreliable data, as much as 11 years for small
firms. The authors do not state whether these figures allow for the time value of
money. If the figures were subjected to an appropriate rate of discount then the
discounted payback period would be longer.
The authors’ reservations regarding the information they received seems to be
based on the view that companies rarely measure the benefits or costs of their EMS.
Why? The authors do not answer this question, but it may be the difficulty of
identifying costs which can be lost in the overhead costs of the company. Also, the
financial and technical documentation may not be sufficiently sophisticated to enable
the identification and extraction of the necessary data (Freimann and Walther, 2001,
p. 99). Some accountants have suggested that the adoption of an activity based costing
system may make the tracking of environmental expenditures easier (Kreuze and
Newell, 1994). This in turn may make it easier for organizations to focus on the costs
they incur in operating an EMS. Of course, there may be another reason for the failure
to measure the costs and benefits. If an EMS is to be effective and efficient then it
clearly needs to become so tightly integrated with the management control systems
that it becomes indistinguishable as a separate entity.
But whilst the financial benefits may be difficult to identify there are additionally
non-monetary economic benefits. These include the reorganization of environmental
activities within the organization and their incorporation of systems to increase the
monitoring efficiency. In the Swiss research 76 per cent of companies saw felt this was
of high value to them. Other economic benefits judged to be important were complying
with the law, risk minimization, cost reduction, employee motivation, corporate image,
and improved relationships with public authorities (Hamschmidt and Dyllick, 2001,
pp. 50-1).
Costs of EMS to SMEs
Further evidence on the cost of EMSs comes from a Mexican study targeting small
to medium sized enterprises (SMEs). It argues that as Mexican citizens are becoming
increasingly environmentally aware they will not tolerate further environmental
degradation. In Mexico SMEs are a major source of such pollution, but the costs of
acquiring a certified environmental management system such as ISO 14001 is
beyond their reach. In order for Mexican SMEs to take advantage of ISO 14001 there
is a need for low cost certification. Mexican SMEs are facing the requirement to hold
an ISO 14001 if they wish to deal with some large international companies. But, they
will also need to see an economic rate of return beyond this requirement if they
are to be persuaded to invest. The advantages to the environment in this case are
tangible. The study found that in the case of the Mexican SMEs there were real
environmental improvements when an EMS was adopted (Wells and Galbraith,
1999).
The difficulties in relation to cost for SMEs in implementing an EMS are noted
elsewhere in the context of EMAS. An Italian study found that financial barriers were
not the main obstacle to SMEs registering for EMAS. The main problem appeared to
be the complexity of these systems. Nevertheless, the research notes that some of the
difficulties encountered with EMAS could be surmounted if SMEs co-operated (Biondi
et al., 2000). Co-operation resulted in the use of joint auditing teams and the application
of common solutions to problems. This approach reduced costs. The perspective that
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EMAS developed in the SMEs, with its emphasis on reducing waste, resulted in further
co-operation. This yielded external economies of scale. For example, neighbouring
SMEs in the same industrial sector, ceramic tiles, were able to share equipment used to
recycle broken tiles.
Practical difficulties
ISO 14001 is essentially a formal conformance standard, i.e. it is concerned with
whether an organisation’s management procedures are consistent with its
environmental policy. It is not concerned with performance issues such as whether
such systems actually protect the environment (Environmental Manager, 1996, p. 14).
The emphasis is therefore on operational issues – not strategic ones. The authors of
the Swiss study of ISO 14001 state: “Audits can be a powerful tool for achieving
effective improvements. However, in practice, an over-emphasis on compliance and
conformance to standard requirements often does not support the intended
improvement process” (Hamschmidt and Dyllick, 2001, p. 52; see also Freimann and
Walther, 2001, p. 95). Although conformance standards are not without value (as we
argue elsewhere in this paper), they are apt to lead to “paper-chases” and “box-ticking”
exercises. According to MacLean (2004, p. 13)
Proceduralising any business activity tends to minimise strategic thinking. In many respects,
ISO 14001 and EMAS illustrate one of the worst trends in environmental management. They
may create the illusion to executive management that all is well because the process is in
place; management’s attention may shift from improving performance goals to completing a
procedure and getting the box checked. Essentially, environmental concerns are reduced to
a binary question, “Are we certified or not?”
The formal requirements of environmental management and auditing systems may be
simultaneously too complicated and too vague. This can cause serious problems for
SMEs. The situation is described by Biondi et al. (2000, p. 59)
Both EMAS and ISO 14001 were intended to provide guidelines for correct implementation
of an EMS to a wide range of enterprises, including very complex and large sites and
organisations. This is why the requirements tend to be as exhaustive as possible,
sometimes making them too detailed and complex for SMEs. On the other hand, because
they must be applicable to any kind of enterprise, neither EMAS nor ISO 14001 could
have been tailored to suit the needs of all types of organisations, and thus, despite the
detailed approach, they still leave room for a flexible interpretation. So companies may
still encounter a lack of clarity on what is exactly required for an effective EMS in certain
specific situations. . .
Many SMEs lack the internal expertise (including management expertise) to establish
environmental policies and effective management and auditing systems. Likely
difficulties may not be fully appreciated (Hillary, 1998, p. 190)
The complexity of issues and stakeholders associated with an organisation’s environmental
impact is frequently underestimated by management. This can lead to responsibility for the
implementation of an organisation’s EMS being given to a quality or health and safety
manager with little or no experience of environmental issues.
These problems are particularly acute in developing countries (Krut and Gleckman,
1998, p. 89).
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A crisis of confidence?
In order to be successful, externally validated management and auditing systems need
to be credible, i.e. they must command the respect of stakeholders. Without this
credibility, their value is very limited. A market-based instrument must give
appropriate market signals.
Although many SMEs lack the expertise to operate EMSs systems effectively, the
number of externally validated systems continues to rise. In December 1997, there were
4,433 certified ISO 14001 systems. By December 2002, the world total had risen to
49,462 (ISO, 2003, p. 32).
There is growing evidence that many external verifiers are willing to approve EMSs
without conducting effective investigations. A recent survey was conducted by
Environmental Data Services and the United Kingdom’s Institute of Environmental
Management and Assessment. A respondent who works for a major certification body
commented:
A certified EMS is only as good as the company implementing it. If the top management
just want a greenwash or a badge on the wall then there are certification bodies out
there that will do that – i.e. give certification based on intent rather than actual
evidence . . . Pressure should be put on the UK Accreditation Service to name and shame the
poor performing certification bodies rather than dragging us all down with them
(Hamschmidt and Dyllick, 2001, p. 52; Hillary, 1998, pp. 189-90; ENDS, 2003a, pp. 20-3;
ENDS, 2003b, p. 20).
According to Krut and Gleckman (1998, p. 60), “there is strong motivation to use
certifiers who have the lowest standards or to discover those certifiers who might be
most receptive to bribery”. This seems to be a serious problem in developing countries.
An official at a standard-setting institution said:
Say we have a company that we . . . feel should lose their certification. But the consequences
would be bad for domestic foreign revenue. This will put political pressure on us to let them
keep their certification. The same applies to a company that is an exporter, for example to the
EU. There is strong political pressure for certification to be granted so that the export marker
is maintained. This pressure is not documented anywhere, but it is the main issue we speak
about (Krut and Gleckman, 1998, p. 74).
Any guilt or embarrassment felt in such circumstances may be at least partially offset
by the widespread view that ISO 14001 is an unofficial barrier to trade with developed
counties (Krut and Gleckman, 1998, p. 78; Roht-Arriaza, 2002, p. 262).
Do EMSs lead to environmental improvement?
It is easy to be cynical about this. Certainly there is a great deal of evidence that ISO
14001 with its less rigorous certification and external auditing leaves serious concerns
about the reduction of the environmental impact where EMSs are implemented. Recent
ENDs reports offer numerous examples of disenchantment with the certification
approach. In Asia there is considerable disillusionment with environmental
consultants and verifiers[3].
The quality of the data produced is a major source of uncertainty. In the year 1999, a
questionnaire was sent to the environmental managers of every ISO 14001 certified
company in Switzerland and 54 per cent responded (i.e. 158 questionnaires). The results
are described by Hamschmidt and Dyllick (2001, p. 49):
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Some 60 per cent of the companies experienced at least “some decrease” in their material and
energy flows in relation to turnover . . . Only 10 per cent, however, reported a “strong
decrease”, and 30 per cent either did not measure the changes or even experienced a
worsening in efficiency . . . Some 50 per cent of the companies experienced at least “some
decrease” [in material and energy flows], but only 10 per cent reported a “strong decrease”;
40 per cent did not know or even experienced an increase . . . Looking at products, the
companies reported that only small decreases with regard to environmental impacts had
occurred since EMS implementation . . . Fully 17 per cent did not know.
The authors correctly observe: “Not knowing at all has to be considered as being the
worst answer of all, since EMSs above all should create knowledge and sensitivity,
even before improvements in productivity occur”[4].
Still, there is no doubt that larger companies are taking environmental monitoring
more seriously than is required by the international standard, and are monitoring and
controlling the output from their organizations that has an environmental impact.
Perhaps their successes will have an impact on future revisions of the ISO 14001 and
EMAS, revisions that emphasize performance rather than conformance.
Nevertheless, from an economic viewpoint there are serious resource implications in
this. If a large number of EMSs are largely ineffective in achieving environmental
improvement, and in effect bulldogs with rubber teeth, then they are economically
inefficient systems that not only do not help to cut down on environmental waste but
actually create it by absorbing management time that could be better used elsewhere,
increased expenditure on paper resources and other consumables, not to mention the
ineffective impact of high salaried consultants with a predilection for ticking boxes.
One of the criticisms of the command and control approach is that it is a blunt
instrument. Governments generally employ ambient, technology or performance based
standards.
These standards are not allocatively efficient and are unlikely to be cost-effective. If
the above criticisms of ISO 14001 and, by association, EMAS, are well founded then
they too are likely to be as ineffective in achieving the sustainability objective as the
government based instruments.
Conclusion
Although it is entirely reasonable to have doubts about specific managerial
environmental and auditing systems, it seems clear that such systems have (and will
continue to have) an important role to play in environmental protection[5].
The jury is clearly out on the success or failure of the creation and implementation
of standards for environmental management systems. What is clear from the evidence
is that the standards themselves will not lead to environmental improvement, because
they are not designed to do so. That said, they may have a useful function in getting
the managers to focus on the environmental impacts their organizations are making,
and in the process of gaining certification actually produce some tangible reduction in
pollution. It seems that for larger organizations that are already taking stewardship of
the environment seriously the standards will offer little more than an additional
marketing tool, albeit one that one will be required by the market to have, but which in
truth leads to little benefit. What is clear is that the self-monitoring approach of the
standards may not lead to a more economically effective monitoring system than
the command and control approach. The difference between the two approaches is
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something that economists might explore in the future. But the question must be
asked, can society afford all the consultants that both ISO 14001 and EMAS have
spawned?
Notes
1. See generally Ackerman and Stewart (1985) and Hussen (1999). For a moderate defence of
command and control environmental regulation see Steinzor (1998).
2. Similar criticisms have been made of eco-labels (Staffin, 1996).
3. “There is a strong feeling that ISO 14001 is not only a market requirement, it is a market
creation. Many companies in Asia complain that ISO is being driven by consultants seeking
business . . . Not only has a market been created into which developing countries feel they
have to buy; there may be limited organisational or environmental value to be derived from
the standard. ISO 14001 will be a market, not an environmental, standard.” (Krut and
Gleckman, 1998, p. 76).
4. It should be noted that surveys of this kind raise serious methodological problems. It is
reasonable to assume that the respondents tend to be the more environmentally aware
companies (Hamschmidt and Dyllick, 2001, pp. 44-5). Environmental managers also have
personal interests. They have strong incentives to show that their systems are reducing
costs. According to Freimann and Walther (2001, p. 100): “To sum up, one can probably say
that most companies do not know their own sustainability status, let alone what that term
may imply. Any academic who tries to evaluate this status and compare it with other
companies or with the average status in one sector or the whole economy is therefore in a
very difficult position”.
5. In 2002, the British Government published an important white paper (formal consultation
document) titled Modernising Company Law (Cm. 5553). It seems that environmental
considerations are at last to be integrated within British company law. If the proposals are
enacted by Parliament, companies will have a duty to disclose relevant environmental
information in their annual operating and financial reports (OFRs). A general duty will also
be imposed on all directors to have regard to the likely environmental impacts of their
actions (where material to the success of their companies). For a useful discussion, see
Howell and Pontin (2003).
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